

Loquēla (Journal of Linguistics, Literature, and Education)

<https://smarteducenter.org/index.php/Loquela/index>

Volume 4 Number 1 2026

Institutional Divergence within the Ministry of Religious Affairs: Responses to the Establishment Plan of a State Confucian College

¹Herza Herza, ²M. Aries Taufiq, ³Izcha Pricispa, ⁴Nur Faizza Tunnisa

^{1,3,4} Sociology, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Bangka Belitung

² English Literature, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Bangka Belitung

*Corresponding Author, Email: herzazul@ubb.ac.id

ARTICLE INFO

Received: 10-03-2026

Revised: 11-05-2026

Accepted: 25-05-2026

Published: 30-05-2026

Volume: 4

Issue: 1

DOI: 10.61276/loquela.v4i1.99

KEYWORDS

Institutional Divergence; Governmentality; Ministry of Religious Affairs; Confucian State College

ABSTRACT

The establishment of the Confucian State College of Indonesia (SETIAKIN) in the Bangka Belitung Islands Province was initiated by the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) in 2019 to expand access to higher religious education for the Confucian community. The policy generated considerable controversy, particularly among conservative Islamic groups concerned about its potential impact on religious identity and social harmony. This study examines institutional divergence among actors within the Provincial and Central Bangka offices of MoRA in responding to the proposed institution. Employing an exploratory-descriptive qualitative approach, data were collected through interviews, observation, and document analysis. Drawing on Michel Foucault's concepts of discourse, power/knowledge, and governmentality, the findings reveal that divergent responses emerged from competing governmental rationalities and discursive constructions of social reality. Although several actors initially opposed the project, their positions gradually shifted toward compliance following the central ministry's reaffirmation of the policy. The study argues that this shift reflected bureaucratic adaptation rather than ideological transformation, highlighting how religious policy implementation is shaped by contesting discourses within state institutions.



This work is licensed under [Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 Internasional](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/).

Copyright © 2026, Herza et al.

Introduction

Since mid-2022, a particular issue in the Bangka Belitung (Babel) Province has significantly captured both public and media attention. This matter pertains to the planned establishment of a Confucian State College, which has elicited polarized public responses. The discourse even garnered commentary from Ade Armando, a social media influencer and Lecturer in Communication Studies at the Universitas Indonesia, through a video content titled “*Ulama Bangka Belitung Menolak Perguruan Tinggi Konghucu*” (Bangka Belitung Ulama Reject Confucian College), broadcasted on Cokro TV's YouTube channel in 2022.

A closer trace reveals that information regarding the planned development of the Confucian state college had actually surfaced since 2019 (Herza, 2022). However, public discourse during that period was not as intense as that observed between 2022 and late 2023, primarily because both the government and the public were focused on mitigating the COVID-19 pandemic (Suryadinata, 2022). Since 2022, several factions have explicitly declared their opposition to the establishment of the institution within the province known by its motto *Serumpun Sebalai* (united in harmony). Mass organizations, namely the Bangka Belitung Islamic Ummah Alliance and the Central Bangka Islamic Ummah Alliance, went so far as to hold a direct audience with the provincial office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA Babel)—acting as the representative of the central ministry that initiated the program. Furthermore, actors within these mass organizations also conducted a formal audience with the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) of Central Bangka Regency (Nita, 2022)."



Picture 1: An audience between the Bangka Belitung Islamic Ummah Alliance and the Head of the Regional Office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Kemenag) of the Bangka Belitung Islands (Source: Bangkapos.com)



Picture 2: An audience at the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) of Central Bangka Regency (Source: Bangkapos.com)



Since 2019, the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) of Bangka Belitung has similarly expressed its opposition to the establishment of the Confucian State College within the province, proposing instead that the institution be built in a region with a majority ethnic Chinese population (Yulianti, 2024). This reality is particularly intriguing given that, despite essentially functioning as a mass non-governmental organization, MUI is widely recognized as an entity closely integrated with the government structure.

Another compelling aspect, which serves as a foundational problem for this proposed study, is the reality indicating a divergence of attitudes among actors within government institutions—specifically within the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA)—in responding to the planned establishment of the Confucian college in the Bangka Regency. Based on preliminary observations and interviews conducted by the researcher within the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) offices at both the Central Bangka Regency and Bangka Belitung Islands Provincial levels, there appeared to be a tendency among certain actors within these institutions to hold interpretations and positions that differed from those of their leaders, who were strongly supportive of the policy agenda promoted by the central government through the Ministry of Religious Affairs. This phenomenon is conceptualized in this study as an “institutional divergence” organization. The notion of institutional divergence is employed to explain how actors within the same institution may adopt divergent responses, attitudes, and positions toward a development initiative that is formally advanced by their own organization, even though the idea and policy direction originated primarily from the central Ministry of Religious Affairs.

Given this background, it is intellectually valuable to direct this research toward a deeper investigation into the dynamics of this attitudinal divergence among actors within government institutions, particularly within Kemenag, regarding the establishment of the Confucian state college. Additionally, this study will examine the socio-political contexts that influence the stances of these institutional actors. The urgency and significance of this research are further heightened by recent media reports, the central Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) had begun implementing the project by July 2025; concurrently, at the local level, the public and various institutional actors remain deeply divided. Another critical urgency lies in the fact that existing literature concerning the development of the Confucian college has not yet addressed the specific focal point proposed in this study."



Method

This study employs an exploratory-descriptive research design with a qualitative approach. Descriptive research seeks to portray the characteristics of an ongoing phenomenon and to examine the factors underlying its emergence. Meanwhile, exploratory-descriptive research is intended to generate a comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon and to develop inductive generalizations concerning the actors, processes, and situations under investigation (Umar, 2011; Mudjiyanto, 2018; Wekke, 2019). Utilizing this exploratory framework and inductive logic, the present study aims to examine institutional divergence among actors within the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA), specifically at the Provincial Office of the Bangka Belitung Islands and the Central Bangka Regency Office, in response to the planned establishment of the Confucian State College of Indonesia (SETIAKIN). In addition, the study explores the socio-political considerations and organizational dynamics that shaped the varying responses of these actors toward the policy initiative. Accordingly, the scope of this research is limited to actors operating within these two MoRA institutions and does not extend to other governmental or non-governmental organizations.

Data were collected through interviews, observation, and document analysis. The informants consisted of six key actors from the Ministry of Religious Affairs institutions under study. They included the Heads of the Provincial Office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Bangka Belitung Islands and the Central Bangka Regency Office, officials from the Confucian Community Guidance Division (Bimbingan Masyarakat Konghucu), and representatives of the Interreligious Harmony Forum (Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama/FKUB) affiliated with these institutions. These informants were selected purposively based on their direct involvement, institutional responsibilities, and knowledge regarding the planning and public debate surrounding the establishment of SETIAKIN.

The collected data and information were analyzed using a qualitative approach. Following the interactive model of qualitative data analysis, three concurrent analytical procedures were employed: data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing/verification (Creswell, 2017; Miles & Huberman, 2014). These processes were conducted iteratively throughout the research in order to identify patterns of institutional divergence, competing interpretations, and the organizational rationalities underlying actors' responses to the proposed establishment of SETIAKIN.



Discussion

1. Background of the Establishment of the Confucian State Higher Education Institution in the Bangka Belitung Islands Province

The establishment of the Confucian State College (SETIAKIN) in Bangka Belitung, which is currently officially designated as the SETIAKIN (*Sekolah Tinggi Agama Konghucu Indonesia Negeri*) is a state endeavor primarily aimed at addressing the shortage of Confucian religious education teachers in numerous schools, particularly within Bangka Belitung itself. Consequently, the institution targets the opening of only three study programs, namely: Religious Education for Confucian Teachers, Religious Education for Confucian Religious Counselors, and Public Communication Education.

Regarding why the Malay land—the Bangka Belitung Islands Province—was selected as the locus for SETIAKIN's establishment, media reports and interviews conducted by the research team with Ministry of Religious Affairs (Kemenag) informants reveal that the primary reason is that the province is considered to have the largest population of Confucian adherents in Indonesia. Furthermore, it is envisioned to serve as a testament to the strengthening of religious harmony and moderation in the Malay land. It is undeniable that the ethnic Chinese community in Bangka Belitung has a long-standing historical presence, predating the inception of Indonesia (Ibrahim et al., 2022a). They originally came from Guangdong, China, to Bangka Island to work in the tin mining industry. Most of those who arrived were men, without bringing their wives or other female family members. This situation also marked the beginning of interethnic marriages between the Chinese migrants and the local population, who were considered indigenous at the time, namely the Malay ethnic group (Ibrahim et al., 2022b). The centuries-long existence of the ethnic Chinese on Bangka Island, specifically in Pangkalpinang, is evidenced by a Chinese cemetery complex which is claimed to be the largest in Southeast Asia (Ibrahim et al., 2022a).

Interviews with the regional representative office of MoRA in the Bangka Belitung Islands, specifically with Mr. Sugiyo from the Confucian Community Guidance section (*Bimas Konghucu*), corroborated this justification. According to him, the rationale for constructing SETIAKIN in Bangka Belitung lies in the fact that the province's ethnic Chinese population ranks among the top three largest nationwide, alongside West Kalimantan and West Java. Based on Mr. Sugiyo's account, the ethnic Chinese population on Bangka Island alone currently exceeds 30,000 individuals. The following is the research team's documentation during the



interview with Mr. Sugiyo at the Ministry of Religious Affairs Office of the Bangka Belitung Islands Province.



(Picture 3: Research data collection interview with Mr. Sugiyo (Confucian Community Guidance, MoRA Bangka Belitung Islands Province, 2024)

2. Dynamics of Opposition and Support

As previously elucidated, the opposition toward the establishment of the Confucian State Higher Education Institution primarily emanates from conservative Islamic groups, who harbor concerns regarding the institution's impact on Islamic identity and values within society. They argue that the founding of the college could trigger social friction and potentially alter how the younger generation perceives religious values. According to an informant from the Regional Office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Bangka Belitung Islands Province, Mr. Sugiyo, those opposing the plan actually fear that the establishment of SETIAKIN might jeopardize the longstanding harmony between the ethnic Malay and Chinese communities in Bangka Belitung. However, in his view, this apprehension is illogical, given that the adherence patterns of Confucianism are inherently not as expansive as those of other religions.

“They presume that there will be a religious proselytization mission driven by Confucian individuals coming to study in Bangka Belitung. However, based on my six-year tenure in the Confucian Community Guidance section, Confucian adherents are not aggressive in spreading their religion. Confucianism is not a religion targeted at all segments of society; it develops almost exclusively within the ethnic Chinese



community (direct communication with Mr. Sugiyo, MoRA of Bangka Belitung Islands Province, August 1, 2024)."



(Picture 4: Two research enumerators conducting an interview with Mr. M. Karyawan, Head of MoRA Central Bangka Regency)

Then, are the actors vehemently opposing the establishment of SETIAKIN? Citing the statement of the Head of the Central Bangka MoRA Office, Mr. M. Karyawan (August 1, 2024), the factions vocally rejecting the college consist of individuals formerly affiliated with Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and the Front Pembela Islam (FPI)—groups historically known for their hardline stances toward groups differing from them. In addition to these former HTI and FPI affiliates, Mr. M. Karyawan noted that one individual within the Forum for Religious Harmony (FKUB), a semi-governmental organization, also opposes the project. According to insights from several research informants, this particular FKUB representative is reportedly affiliated with the two aforementioned banned organizations. The following is the documentation of the research enumerator during the interview with Mr. M. Karyawan.

The findings indicate that opposition to the establishment of a Confucian state college was not merely directed toward the creation of a new educational facility. Rather, it reflected a broader discursive struggle over religious identity, ethnic relations, and the social order considered desirable by particular groups. From a Foucauldian perspective, knowledge is never neutral but is intrinsically linked to power relations that shape how social reality is understood and represented (Foucault,



1980). Concerns expressed by opponents that the establishment of SETIAKIN would disrupt the long-standing harmony between the Malay and Chinese communities or facilitate the expansion of Confucianism can be interpreted as a discursive construction of social threat. Through such discourse, opposition groups sought to produce and legitimize a particular version of truth regarding the potential consequences of the institution's establishment, thereby influencing public perceptions and policy debates.

Foucault (1972) argues that discourse functions by determining which forms of knowledge are considered legitimate and which are marginalized. In the present case, opponents constructed a narrative portraying the proposed institution as a potential source of social division and religious insecurity. However, this narrative was challenged by officials within the Ministry of Religious Affairs, academics, and moderate religious actors who drew upon alternative forms of knowledge regarding the nature of Confucianism and the role of higher education. As one informant noted, Confucianism in Indonesia has historically not been characterized by aggressive proselytization and remains largely associated with the ethnic Chinese community. This competing interpretation illustrates the existence of multiple regimes of truth, whereby different actors sought to define the meaning of religious diversity, social harmony, and public interest according to their own claims to knowledge and legitimacy.

The concept of governmentality further helps explain why divergent responses emerged not only between state and society but also among actors within the Ministry of Religious Affairs itself. According to Foucault (1991), governmentality refers to the ways in which governing is exercised through particular forms of knowledge, rationalities, and techniques aimed at managing populations. In this case, the central Ministry of Religious Affairs framed the establishment of a Confucian state higher education institution as part of a broader agenda of religious recognition, minority rights protection, and the promotion of religious moderation. Nevertheless, this governmental rationality was not uniformly internalized by actors at the local level. Some local actors appeared to be more strongly influenced by dominant social discourses emphasizing threats to religious identity and communal harmony. As a result, actors operating within the same bureaucratic structure interpreted and responded to the policy in different ways, despite formally belonging to the same institution.

From this perspective, the controversy surrounding the establishment of the Confucian state higher education institution illustrates a process of institutional divergence generated by the coexistence of competing governmental rationalities



within a single state institution. Rather than operating in a linear, top-down manner, power circulates through multiple discursive networks that enable local actors to reinterpret, negotiate, modify, or resist policy agendas promoted by the central government (Foucault, 1980). The divergent positions adopted by actors within the Ministry of Religious Affairs therefore reveal how state policies are continuously shaped by competing forms of knowledge, discourse, and governmental reasoning. Consequently, institutional divergence should be understood not simply as organizational inconsistency but as the outcome of ongoing struggles over the production and legitimacy of knowledge within the apparatus of governance.

3. Attitudinal Shifting Within the Ministry of MoRA

The research findings demonstrate a significant attitudinal shift among actors within the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) in response to the evolving situation. Initially, when opposition to the establishment of the Confucian State College reached its peak, Kemenag actors explicitly demonstrated their disapproval. However, over time and following the central ministry's reaffirmation to realize the college, their stances began to shift.

Based on interviews conducted with key informants from MoRA in both the Bangka Belitung Province and Central Bangka Regency, there are indications that their current stance—which tends to conform to the central ministry's directives regarding the development program—can be understood as a defensive posture. This attitude has emerged concurrently with the strengthening discourse surrounding the establishment of the Confucian college by the central authority.

From a hermeneutic perspective, the gestures and rhetoric employed by the informants reveal profound ambiguity and diverse considerations prior to granting compliance. This implies that although there is a tendency to acquiesce to central directives, underlying apprehensions persist. A critical factor that cannot be overlooked is the presence of grassroots opposition movements represented by specific interest groups. These movements retain the potential to re-emerge and alter the dynamics of the response toward the institution's development program. Collectively, these findings underscore the complexity of attitudes within government institutions and highlight the importance of accounting for various social factors that can influence the implementation of public policy.

The observed shift can be interpreted as an effort to align with broader government policy directions. The neutral stance currently exhibited by Kemenag actors reflects a institutional necessity to maintain organizational stability and internal harmony. This demonstrates that despite initial divergence of opinions among the actors, they ultimately tend to comply with the decisions mandated by the central authority."



4. From a Divided Position to a Unified Stance

The findings of this study fundamentally point to an intriguing dynamic, demonstrating a significant attitudinal shift among actors within the Ministry of Religious Affairs institutions—both at the Central Bangka Regency and the Bangka Belitung Islands Province levels—toward the establishment of the SETIAKIN in Bangka Belitung. Throughout the 2022–2023 period, several actors openly voiced objections or disagreements regarding the development plan, which was previously commonly referred to as the Confucian State Higher Education Institution. This opposition manifested in various forms, ranging from direct statements in internal forums to critical inquiries concerning the urgency of establishing a state Confucian religious college in Bangka Belitung. This condition is what the researcher defines as an attitudinal divergence within the institution, where a segment of actors supported the government's policy, while others maintained a highly skeptical stance toward the project.

Furthermore, the research data indicates that the aforementioned configuration of attitudes underwent a noticeable shift during the 2024–2025 period. Actors who previously exhibited resistance no longer openly declared their opposition. Instead, some opted for a more neutral position, while others went so far as to explicitly express support for the establishment of SETIAKIN. Nonetheless, it must be underscored that this shift does not necessarily denote an ideological transformation or a substantive change in the actors' convictions regarding the necessity of the college. Based on interviews and observations, this attitudinal realignment was predominantly driven by a process of adaptation toward the policy direction of the central government and formally established organizational decisions. In other words, this transition can be characterized as a matter of institutional formality rather than a reflection of the actors' actual perspectives or genuine ideological stances.

This phenomenon can be conceptualized as a form of bureaucratic adaptation that commonly occurs within hierarchical government organizations. In this context, institutional loyalty toward official policies becomes a more dominant consideration than the personal preferences or individual views of the actors. Consequently, the support displayed during the 2024–2025 period reflects compliance with organizational mandates rather than an expression of approval rooted in deep ideological conviction. Therefore, the shifting positions of these actors cannot be simplistically interpreted as the dissolution of resistance; rather, it represents a calculated alignment with the authority structure and the intensifying policy directives from the central level.

Interestingly, this diversity of attitudes was fully recognized by the leadership of the Ministry of Religious Affairs at both the Central Bangka Regency and the Bangka Belitung Islands Province levels. The research data reveals that the divergent views among internal actors were not perceived by management as a serious impediment that



could jeopardize the implementation of the SETIAKIN development program. Instead, this situation was viewed as a natural dynamic within an organization comprised of individuals with diverse backgrounds and perspectives. As long as these dissenting attitudes did not escalate into organized insubordination or visibly obstruct policy implementation, the leadership tended to treat them as an integral part of the internal adaptation process toward ongoing policy changes.

Conclusion

The establishment of the Confucian State College of Indonesia (SETIAKIN) in Bangka Belitung represents a strategic state initiative aimed at addressing the shortage of Confucian educators and religious counselors while expanding access to higher religious education for the Confucian community. The selection of Bangka Belitung as the site of development reflects not only demographic considerations but also the province's historical role as a center of ethnic Chinese settlement and intercultural coexistence. In this regard, the establishment of SETIAKIN can be understood as part of the state's broader commitment to religious recognition, educational equity, and the promotion of religious moderation.

However, the development process revealed significant contestation both within society and within the state apparatus itself. Opposition from conservative Islamic groups was primarily rooted in concerns over the preservation of religious identity and social harmony. From a Foucauldian perspective, these concerns constituted a discursive construction of social reality through which particular actors sought to define the potential consequences of the institution's establishment. Competing narratives advanced by government officials, academics, and moderate groups challenged these claims by emphasizing the non-proselytizing character of Confucianism and the role of higher education in fostering intercultural dialogue and social inclusion. Consequently, the controversy surrounding SETIAKIN should be understood not merely as a policy dispute but as a contestation between different regimes of truth that sought to shape public perceptions of diversity, religion, and social order.

More importantly, this study demonstrates that institutional divergence within the Ministry of Religious Affairs emerged from the coexistence of multiple governmental rationalities among actors operating within the same bureaucratic structure. While the central government framed SETIAKIN as an instrument of religious recognition and minority inclusion, local actors interpreted the policy through different discursive lenses shaped by personal beliefs, social pressures, and local political contexts. The shift in attitudes observed among several actors between 2022 and 2025 reflects not necessarily a transformation of personal convictions but rather an adaptation to organizational authority and policy imperatives. This finding suggests that bureaucratic compliance does not always indicate ideological consensus; instead, it may represent a strategic accommodation to prevailing institutional expectations.

Furthermore, the findings reveal that leadership within the Ministry of Religious Affairs largely tolerated the existence of divergent views among subordinate actors,



provided that such differences did not obstruct policy implementation. This tolerance illustrates that policy implementation within state institutions is not solely a process of hierarchical control but also one of continuous negotiation among competing forms of knowledge, authority, and governmental reasoning. In Foucauldian terms, power operates not as a centralized force imposed from above but as a dispersed network of relations through which actors interpret, negotiate, and reproduce policy objectives.

This study therefore contributes to the literature by demonstrating that institutional divergence is not merely an organizational anomaly or a sign of bureaucratic dysfunction. Rather, it represents a manifestation of competing discourses and governmental rationalities within state institutions. The case of SETIAKIN highlights how the implementation of religious policy in Indonesia is shaped by ongoing struggles over the production of knowledge, the construction of legitimacy, and the governance of religious diversity. Future studies may further explore how similar forms of institutional divergence emerge in other policy sectors and how state actors negotiate competing rationalities in the implementation of policies concerning religion, identity, and minority rights.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to express their gratitude to Universitas Bangka Belitung (UBB), particularly the Institute for Research and Community Services (LPPM), for funding this research project through a research grant, allowing the team to investigate a highly relevant socio-economic issue.

References

- Burchell, G., Gordon, C., & Miller, P. (Eds.). (1991). *The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality*. University of Chicago Press.
- Cokro TV. (2022, June 8). Ulama Bangka Belitung Menolak Perguruan Tinggi Konghucu | Logika Ade Armando [Video]. YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jPyiRAnXF68>
- Creswell, J. W. (2017). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches (5th ed.)*. SAGE Publications.
- Foucault, M. (1972). *The archaeology of knowledge* (A. M. Sheridan Smith, Trans.). Pantheon Books.
- Foucault, M. (1980). *Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972–1977* (C. Gordon, Ed.). Pantheon Books.
- Foucault, M. (1991). Governmentality. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, & P. Miller (Eds.), *The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality* (pp. 87–104). University of Chicago Press.



- Herza. (2022). *The expiration of the political rights of the ethnic Chinese in Bangka Belitung*. Opini Detik.com. <https://news.detik.com/kolom/d-6151359/tertangalnya-hak-politis-warga-tionghoa-bangka-belitung>
- Ibrahim, I., Hidayat, A., & Herza, H. (2022a). Adaptation of the political economy of the grassroots Tionghoa ethnic in Bangka Island, Indonesia. *Masyarakat, Kebudayaan & Politik*, 35(4), 540–553. <https://doi.org/10.20473/mkp.V35I42022.540-553>
- Ibrahim, I., Hidayat, A., & Herza, H. (2022b). Habituation of Chinese Subculture amid Bangka Malay Domination: The Role-sharing Politics. *Society*, 10(2), 146–162. <https://doi.org/10.33019/society.v10i2.424>
- Mahendra, A.B. (2022). *Aliansi Umat Islam Bangka Tengah Tolak Rencana Pembangunan PTN Konghucu di Desa Batu Belubang*. Bangkapos.com. <https://bangka.tribunnews.com/2022/05/31/aliansi-umat-islam-bangka-tengah-tolak-rencana-pembangunan-ptn-konghucu-di-desa-batubelubang>
- Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (2014). *Qualitative data analysis: A Methods Sourcebook*. Sage Publication.
- Mudjiyanto, B. (2018). Exploratory research types in communication studies. *Jurnal Studi Komunikasi dan Media*, 22(1), 65–74. <http://dx.doi.org/10.31445/jskm.2018.220105>
- Nita, C.N. (2022). Aliansi Umat Islam Babel Menolak Rencana Didirikan PTN Konghucu di Bangka Belitung. Bangkapos.com. <https://bangka.tribunnews.com/2022/05/31/aliansi-umat-islam-babel-menolak-rencana-didirikan-ptn-khonghucu-di-bangka-belitung>
- Pricispa, I., Azzahra, Y., Putri, N., & Herza, H. (2023). The discourse battle on the establishment of Confucian State University in the Bangka Belitung Islands Province. *Jurnal Sosiologi Pendidikan Humanis*, 8(2), 116–129. <http://dx.doi.org/10.17977/um021v8i2p116-129>
- Suryadinata, L. (2022). *Can an international state university of Confucianism be established in Indonesia?* (ISEAS Perspective No. 2022/100). ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute. <https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2022-100-can-an-international-state-university-of-confucianism-be-established-in-indonesia-by-leo-suryadinata/>



Loquēla (Journal of Linguistics, Literature, and Education)

<https://smarteducenter.org/index.php/Loquela/index>

Volume 4 Number 1 2026

-
- Umar, H. (2002). *Research methods in organizational communication: A quantitative approach, featuring proposal examples and organizational communication research findings*. Gramedia Pustaka Utama.
- Umar, H. (2011). *Research methods for business undergraduate theses and master's theses*. Rajawali Pers.
- Wekke, I. S., (2019). *Social research methods*. Gawe Buku.
- Yulianti, C. (2024). *The first Confucian State Higher Education Institution in Indonesia to be built starting July 2024, featuring these 3 study programs*. Detik.com. <https://www.detik.com/edu/perguruan-tinggi/d-7167999/ptn-konghucu-pertama-di-ri-dibangun-mulai-juli-2024-bakal-ada-3-prodi-ini>



This work is licensed under [Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 Internasional](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/).
Copyright © 2026, Herza et al.